Commentary.
Steve Pieper: Strategy or Tactic? A Step Back From the Conventional Approach to Middle Eastern Terrorism, Terror Financing, Dual-Purpose Organizations, and American Interests
America and its allies possess a wide variety of financial techniques to detect and curtail contributions to violent extremism, but widespread failure to comprehend the terror problem holistically prevents effective application of these formidable tools. Terrorism’s symptoms are easily recognizable, as roadside explosions, suicide bombers, kidnappings, and assassinations litter daily news across the globe. However, much like the common cold, terror’s causes are far more complex and poorly understood. Unfortunately, the full weight and might of America’s political, financial, and military powers have been employed to triage only the symptoms of underlying and widespread political, religious, and economic instability in the societies that produce the lion’s share of today’s suicide attacks. The causal systemic and social factors have wrongly and naively been attributed to an insufficient quantity of democracy, prompting the US to pursue “coercive democratization as a solution to Middle Eastern terrorism,” without regard for target societies’ indigenous realities (Nye in Foreign Affairs p. 139). If the American Middle Eastern adventure is to end favorably, two substantive adjustments must be made: first, Western understanding of “terror” must take on a far more circumspect and introspective focus, enabling realistic and beneficial connection with the societies that “sponsor” terror. Such a focus shift will undoubtedly support the second critical adjustment: the current military approach must be traded for civic engagement, wherein the concerns of the local majority find redress, and authorities on both sides of the chasm bring to bear substantial financial and law enforcement capabilities to locate and neutralize extremists.
Terrorist or Freedom Fighter?
Terror’s functioning definition is largely the western connotation of foreign fanatics committing irrational acts devoid of human principle. The word invokes images of collapsing Twin Towers and masked Islamists beheading hooded prisoners. While the viscerally resonant examples of terror so prevalent in western media fall clearly within most definitions, a broader understanding of terror encompasses actions committed by legitimate states with similarly polarizing, disorienting, and inflammatory effects on a local populace. Understood in this context, terror clearly begets terror, and outrageous acts of agitation commonly viewed as demonic and insane gain a modicum of rational illumination.
Terror is most commonly understood as “a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal [sic] means, entailing the use or threat of violence” (Thornton, 1980, p.73). Terrorism, likewise, is the “systematic use of terror, violence, and intimidation to achieve an end” (American Heritage Dictionary, 1985, p.1256). These definitions are easily palatable in the context of fringe subsets committing acts of violence against legitimate authority, though both definitions clearly encompass terror committed by states. Current connotation, however, emphasizes the state as terror victim and diminishes authority’s role as terror agent. A more explicitly neutral working definition serves to expand the subtext: “[terror] involves beating, killing, robbing, bombing, or other assaults on a civilian population, including relatively unusual items such as forced relocation” (Wickham-Crowley, 1991, p.63). This specific, though natural, expansion of terror’s milieu highlights authority’s role in influencing behavior through violence and disruption of society.
Violence, then, is reciprocal and self-sustaining between opposing groups. Attempts to attribute acts of anti-state terror to the moral, rational, or emotional shortcomings of the perpetrator ignore the systemic conditions that invite hostility, and grossly underestimate the degree of popular support for insurrectionist violence among the mainstream of a polarized society (Atran, 2003, p.1536). Even suicide terrorists, by far the most radical, vilified, and acute examples of terrorism’s various incarnations, exhibit “no socially dysfunctional attributes (fatherless, friendless, or jobless [sic]), or suicidal symptoms,” and “span their population’s normal distribution in terms of education, socioeconomic status, and personality type” (Atran, 2003, p.1537). Suicide terrorists likewise express their parent society’s “collective sense of historical injustice, political subservience, and social humiliation” in the manner most readily available and therefore most politically and socially relevant (Atran, 2003, p.1537). Political rhetoric notwithstanding, modern Islamic terrorists differ from ordinary citizens in only two important ways: jihadists find no other politically or militarily conducive outlet to counter perceived oppression, and believe through politicized religious instruction that their actions are “sanctioned by the divinely revealed religion of Islam” (Atran, 2003, p. 1537). The latter may be alien to western thought (though it is no more illogical than many other beliefs espoused by mainstream religions), but violent, polarizing and disruptive authority contributes generously to the former.
By definition, and in the context of their constituent societies’ values, many anti-state terrorists are not immoral, irrational, or insane. Neither are ostensibly benign establishments incapable of committing acts of terror, regardless of enumerated moral aims. Brutality is both committed and experienced subjectively. Governments wishing to control, deter, and eliminate insurrectionist hostility must therefore doggedly abstain from committing acts of inflammatory violence. Rather than deter acts of terror, militaristic measures that fall short of absolute control serve only to incite further violent agitation.
It is therefore counterproductive to aim the strategic and operational attentions of the United States at “terror” and “terrorism,” as such monikers merely imply (even in the conventional Western lexicon) a tactic in support of objectives counter to our own. Any effective use of America’s financial instruments of power to help secure US interests against the aspirations of opposing groups must appreciate, even leverage, this reality. A more objective evaluation of the formative elements within the societies that produce violent anti-Western movements, and an abandonment of the stubborn non-recognition of the viable political and financial entities that have emerged from such societies, would likely produce a vastly superior approach to influencing the nuanced interplay between legitimate Islamic social institutions and fringe criminal/terror activities.
Meaning What?
Existing US policy relies on monolithic treatment of groups and institutions with violent extremist affiliations. Such a broad brush is required to substantiate the notion that “American is at war, [and will] fight our enemies abroad instead of waiting for them to arrive in our country,” and that the US will “act boldly in freedom’s cause [and] never surrender to evil” (March 2006 National Security Strategy, quoted by Gordon in Foreign Affairs, p. 75). While politically expedient, this approach ignores the inherent intricacies at play, resulting instead in quixotically “setting out a bold course, decisively following it, and winning over allies through victory rather than persuasion” (Gordon in Foreign Affairs, p. 79). Unfortunately, in light of the reality that terror is experienced subjectively, and that many outcomes of American efforts might plausibly be viewed by many in the Muslim community as state terror, “victory” is impossible without effective influence. Most poignantly, success requires persuasion of the groups that produce violent extremists, not just persuasion of traditional Western ally states. Application of conventional military strategy, married conveniently with categorical US notions of “good and evil,” has resulted in a reduced capacity to understand elements of commonality and potential influence among Islamic groups. Heavy-handed strategy and an inappropriate notion of extremism’s indivisibility have combined to portend failure unless America and the West abandon the moralistic approach to Islamist groups and recognize such aggregations as rational political entities.
As Nasr observes, the current situation provides opportunity for the American administration to readdress its flawed notion of internal Islamic machinations: “The Bush administration thought of politics as the relationship between individuals and the state, and so it failed to recognize that people in the Middle East see politics also as the balance of power among communities” (Nasr in Foreign Affairs p.58). Heads of state are often titular figures in regions where local elements struggle for relevance, and daily life continues in a somewhat oblivious, traditional fashion. American legitimacy must be built one interest group at a time, which requires meaningful engagement on sub-national levels to mitigate the roots of violent anti-Western sentiment. Patiently attained access to constituent sub-cultures will reveal the social as well as financial fissures, enabling effective dialogue with local leaders and visibility into the proximally important financial connections. This is only possible if Western policymakers dismiss categorical archetypes and look to understand the intricate nuances. Responsibility must be shared, not wielded.
The financial effort to reduce aggressive extremism must mirror the adjusted larger strategy, but on a more inclusive scale. Current policy has tied utilizing financial measures aimed at disrupting extremist funding to official “designation” of the group as a terrorist entity (Amit’s presentation). While there are clearly a few cases of (usually small) unambiguous terror groups with identifiable and exploitable financial vulnerabilities, there are many more organizations with disparate elements fitting simultaneously into “terrorist,” “terror-supporting,” and “non-terrorist” categories by degrees (Hamas and Hezbollah are prime examples). Thus, it becomes difficult to apply an absolutist approach, because designating large, complex organizations as “terrorist” entities in order to exercise available tools of financial influence carries far-reaching implications.
For example, Hezbollah and Hamas both have well-established political, social, humanitarian, and diplomatic elements. Practical issues aside, enormous political ramifications accompany any effort to freeze their assets. As Sharma notes, Hezbollah and Hamas are far more efficient conduits for upholding every Muslim’s religious obligation for charity—believed to be measured by Allah in terms of funds received, not funds given—than conventional organizations and governments (Amit’s class presentation). Constricting Hezbollah and Hamas funding would thus be readily perceived as a Crusade-esque attempt to deny divine favor, and would undoubtedly generate far more rancor than benefit. Further, because those organizations enjoy sanctioned political legitimacy among their constituencies, and often provide better services and security than their host states, the dismissive “terrorist” label alienates an untenably large portion of the Arab street.
Because of the complexity of such state—populace—substate relationships, it is at least as difficult to gain international support for sweeping financial action as it is to achieve the desired effect. As Sharma notes, little international financial pressure reaches the target group if international financial institutions don’t participate actively and uniformly, and the majority of Europe demonstrates considerable squeamishness at the prospect of declaring groups in Hezbollah and Hamas’ category as terrorist organizations (Amit’s class presentation). Thus, the monolithic approach to extremist financing fails at both ends, as the organizational infrastructure peripherally supporting violence often serves beneficial and legitimate ends in the main, and European states recognize the incongruity in categorical condemnation of complex conglomerates.
Western zero-tolerance rhetoric notwithstanding, reality thus dictates that political and financial anti-extremism policy must focus more on behavior than organizational identity, and current conditions suggest that Western states must acknowledge the political and social leverage gained by groups in Hezbollah’s mold. Such organizations will not disappear because the West wishes instead to deal with the other half of a given state’s political mosaic, and attempts to counterbalance sub-state organizations’ legitimacy with puppet statecraft show poor historical success. The West might gain far more traction by applauding humanitarian efforts and acknowledging a political right to existence while working to curtail the criminal aspects of such organizations’ operations—certainly through instruments of financial power, but, more profitably, from within the target organization itself.
Undoubtedly, any early attempt to diminish funding intended for violent extremism will fall prey to the silver bullet of terror financing: fungibility. Alms for the poor fill the same coffers that train and equip suicide bombers (Ehrenfeld), so early efforts are likely to suffer frustration. As time passes, however, and leaders and constituents of quasi-state, terror-supporting organizations begin to realize the benefits of implied legitimacy in Western circles, there is likely to be reduced systemic underpinning for violence. Extremist bloodshed arises at least in part from “fraternal deprivation, involving feelings of deprivation that arise because of the position of an individual’s group relative to that of other groups” (Moghaddam in American Psychology 2005, p. 163). Those feelings undoubtedly diminish as a given group gains prominence. Further, if relations are managed carefully, a second benefit of greater consequence may emerge: Islamic organizations might come to recognize Western intentions as truly and equitably stability-seeking, rather than viewing US and European overtures as thinly veiled Zionism.
Legitimacy opens the door to exploiting the phenomenon Dishman refers to as the “leaderless nexus” between violent extremism and criminal activity (Dishman 2005 p 237). Because radical factions have suffered significant leadership losses since 9/11, and concomitant anti-crime efforts have similarly decapitated many large-scale criminal elements, both subcultures can be thought of as having been “deregulated.” While the resulting autonomy and anonymity can be a dangerous combination, increasing the de facto legitimacy of viable dual-purpose organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah is likely to encourage self-policing of criminal associations. Just as drug rings formerly avoided association with terrorists because it was “bad for business, [and] cooperation with political radicals would attract unwanted attention” (Dishman 2005 p 238), rising political entities clamoring for legitimacy are unlikely to relish connection with universally unsavory pursuits. And while it is evident that clear hierarchies no longer exist in several widely dispersed associations, larger political organizations are likely to employ “an overarching hierarchy that only uses a network for tactical operations;” for example, “Hezbollah…uses a purposeful blend of hierarchy and network” (Dishman 2005 p.239). There is a strong chance, then, that engaging the political elements of multi-faceted organizations on a public, international scale will yield a far more moderate, mainstream, and accommodating tone from within such organizations—over time, not overnight—and violent extremists will become obsolete and ostracized.
What about now?
Such accommodative steps must be taken on a non-reciprocal basis, simply because any objective viewpoint must certainly recognize the possibility that American actions on Muslim turf have served to polarize local societies, and because Western ideology can hardly be viewed as compulsory in a global context. If the West demands that Hamas recognize Israel’s right to existence (Larrabee in Foreign Affairs 2007 p. 110), then the Western powers must demonstrate a similar existential recognition of such multi-faceted entities. And there can be no true respect of a polity’s right to being without acknowledgment of that entity’s pursuit of outcomes in its own interest. What’s good for the goose is certainly good for the gander, regardless of the endemic quid pro quo expectation implicit in most Western political propositions in the Middle East.
It must be simultaneously recognized that while overtures in favor of acknowledging multi-faceted Middle Eastern organizations enjoy a moral resonance, reciprocity will be a long time in coming. There is a significant ideological and practical gap separating “evil” Muslim organizations and “Satan America” (Landers/Pieper/Phillipone Hezbollah class presentation), and a pervasive (even doctrinal) mistrust of the West underpins most Middle Eastern organizations. Therefore, concurrent measures must be taken to paralyze the many extremist arms while grander accommodation strategy gains traction. Small, violence-centered organizations will be ensnared with the fringe terrorist appendages of larger political associations.
Designate, Schmesignate
Perhaps the largest impediment to financial interdiction of violence is the designation protocol. Within the United States, there is significant interagency friction associated with placing the “terrorist” label on a given organization (Amit’s class presentation). While the requirement seems pedantic, designation statutorily unlocks significant and far-reaching powers otherwise unavailable. International procedure is likewise dependent upon a similar marker, with financial action hinging upon proof of individual or group affiliation with a designated terror organization.
Just as the current monolithic political approach eviscerates many strategic options, categorical practical requirements similarly handicap financial efforts. The remedy parallels the broader strategic recommendation. Regardless of political or ideological pretext, organization, origin, or national sponsorship, funds employed for violent extremism should be constricted by all means available. Fiscal action should be immediately divorced from categorical imperatives, and greater latitude must be afforded to financial policy agencies (with accompanying legislative and executive oversight to secure legitimacy) to permit proactive financial prevention without the requirement to bestow an unqualified “terrorist” label prior to meaningful action. Violent functions of otherwise legitimate organizations must be financially marginalized without stunting further political and social organizational growth, distasteful as it may seem. Absolutist avenues have proven to be impracticable, and laissez-faire approaches are equally unsatisfactory. It is time to explore and exploit the middle ground.
The Baby or the Bathwater?
Long lamented by the financial enforcement community is the supposed informality of Middle Eastern financial transactions. Here, the West falls victim to a mirroring paradigm. Most thinkers dismiss the “informal” nature of the Middle Eastern value transfer system as intractably untrackable, poorly documented, and unsound. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Hawala institution stands atop long-established principles of personal and mutual accountability, trust, and integrity, and untrustworthy rogue actors meet their financial demise swiftly—just as in the Western banking system (Amit’s class presentation).
The key is to work within existing social-financial establishments. As Sharma remarks, America didn’t dry-dock the banking system after the Milken debacle; rather, mild external and extreme internal pressures rapidly restored public confidence in the securities industry (Another Amit reference. That guy is sharp). Business realities reinforce acceptable behavior. Thus, it seems obvious that Western interests should engage the Hawala community on its own terms, embracing the inherent systemic morality to self-regulate violent financiers without wasting effort and focus in abortive attempts to reinvent a centuries-old financial process in a Western image. The Middle Eastern value transfer system is as self-controlling as any in existence. Convince the majority, and the fringes will follow of necessity.
Work and Play Well With Others
As the US Director of National Intelligence observes, non-state, nontraditional actors “blur the traditional distinctions between foreign and domestic, intelligence-related and operational, strategic and tactical” (McConnell in Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 50). In the absence of a contemplative, nonpartisan reworking of jurisdictional and substantive law to consolidate prosecution of violent extremism activities under a single agency, existing territories must enthusiastically overlap. As Rick Schwein’s example illustrates, the parts only equal the sum synergistically. Because of the intricate and adaptive interplay between disparate criminal, social, charitable, and governmental activities supporting violent extremism, institutional collectivism must supercede parochialism. No single agency will likely uncover or unravel the financial underpinnings of an established terror enterprise without the aid of many other departments. To respond to such an amorphous and adaptive extremism infrastructure, “Washington must forge a collaborative approach to intelligence that increases the agility of individual agencies and facilitates the effective coordination and integration of their work” (McConnell in Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 50).
Conclusions.
Absolutism doesn’t work; the United States must disengage its military and recognize the political and social legitimacy of Islamic interest groups with viable and productive elements. Many of those groups have significant ties to violent extremism. US policy should abandon categorical judgment of ideologies and organizations, and focus on curtailing the financial underpinnings of undesirable behavior while granting international legitimacy to Islamic political and social establishments with substantive constituencies. Increased political stature will generate internal pressure to abandon violent activities (particularly in a religious culture that views brutality dimly), and external elements of financial power, unbridled by arbitrary categorizations, will constrict funding for illegal endeavors. The confluence of political legitimization and practical strangulation will render suicide bombs and roadside booby traps obsolete.
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